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Abstract
This paper resumes a source of instability of intertemporal equilibrium
which was anticipated by Garegnani (2003) and criticized by Schefold
(2004). The author points out that a non orthodox tâtonnement pricing must
be accepted if the theory has to be consistent with the Jevons’s law of
unique price. Such tâtonnement prescribes that the rule for adjusting the
relative prices of commodities available at different times is different from
the rule applied to the relative prices of contemporary commodities. The
working of such a mechanism can be a fundamental source of  instability of
the intertemporal equilibria. This result seems to be a challenge for the
stability of general equilibrium also in the context of more realistic non-
tâtonnement disequilibrium processes.
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1. Introduction
This paper reconsiders a recent criticism to the theory of
intertemporal equilibrium. Garegnani (2003) argues that aggregate (in terms
of value) saving and investment functions belong to the determinants of an
intertemporal equilibrium, and that the properties of such functions are a
specific source of non meaningful equilibria, which is not subsumed under
the traditional income or wealth effects. The quasi-equilibrium method
adopted by Garegnani in his criticism is questionable and we share the
objections which Schefold (2004) has addressed to it. However, we contend
that Garegnani’s criticism is valid independently of his quasi-equilibrium
method. We shall reformulate the argument using a different approach
which runs through the following analytical steps: i) a certain
characterization of Jevons’s law and the recognition of the existence of a
uniform rate of return associated with an intertemporal equilibrium, ii) a
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2reinterpretation of the model of individual behaviour underlying the excess
demand functions, iii) the adoption of a tâtonnement pricing consistent with
i)-ii),  and iv) the analysis of the specific source of non meaningful
equilibria which derives from the properties of the excess demand for
capital flows. In particular, we shall explain why the auctioneer must follow
a non orthodox tâtonnement, in which the rule for the adjustment of the
relative prices of commodities available at different times is different from
the rule applied to the relative prices of contemporary commodities. The
working of such a mechanism will point out a basic source of instability.
This result, which was anticipated by Garegnani (2003), seems to be a
challenge for the stability of intertemporal general equilibrium, even in the
context of more realistic non-tâtonnement analyses of disequilibrium.
 2. Hahn’s (Garegnani’s) model of intertemporal equilibrium
Let us formulate a simplified version of the intertemporal equilibrium model
which Hahn (1982) used in his criticism of the neo-Ricardians and which
Garegnani (2003) resumed to introduce his criticism to the theory of
intertemporal equilibrium. Our revision consists in assuming that i) each
market is cleared in equilibrium by strictly positive prices and strict equality
between demand and supply and ii) the linear techniques are given. The
economy is assumed to exist for one period starting at time T = 0 and ending
at time T = 1.  The commodities of the economy are two non storable goods
a, b available at times T = 0, 1  and labour performed during the period
[0,1]. Let 00 , ba PP  be the prices of a, b available at  T = 0; 11 , ba PP , the prices
3of a, b available at T =1; 1W  the wage rate. All prices and the wage rate are
nominal and wages are assumed to be paid at T = 1.
The price equations under perfect competition and constant returns to scale:
0011 baaaaa PbPaWlP ++=
0011 bbabbb PbPaWlP ++=                   (1)
where ba ll , are given positive labour coefficients, bbaa baba ,,, are given
positive coefficients of goods a,b used as circulating capital.  The
technology is assumed to be viable.
Let  )(×jTD ,  , baj = ,  denote the demand function for consumption
of goods a, b available at time 1,0=T and ( )×  the relation with the
independent variables ),,,,( 11100 WPPPP baba .
Market clearing equations for commodities available at  T = 0:
)()( 1100 BaAaDA baa ++×=
)()( 1100 BbAbDB bab ++×=      (2)
where 00 , BA are given endowments of goods a,b at T = 0;  11, BA  are
quantities of goods, a, b produced during the period and available for
consumption at T = 1.
Labour market clearing:
4         LBlAl ba =+ 11                  (3)
where L is a given supply of labour.
Market clearing equations for commodities available at time T =1:
)(11 ×= aDA
)(11 ×= bDB      (4)
where )(),( 11 ×× ba DD  are demand functions for consumption of goods a, b at
time T =1.
All demand functions are homogeneous of degree zero in
),,,,( 11100 baba PPWPP  and satisfy Walras identity:  
1111000010000 )()()()( bbaabbaaba PDPDPDPDLWPBPA ×+×+×+×º++           (5)
Let us assume good b available at T = 1 as the standard of value. The
equation of price normalization 
              11 =bP .                                                    (6)
One equation among (1)-(4) depends on the others; therefore a solution to
(1), (6), under the non negativity constraints, determines the quantities
produced 11, BA  and the prices WPPPP baba ,,,, 1100 .  An equilibrium solution
determines  also the quantities consumed at  T = 0,1,   the quantities  saved
and invested at T = 0  and implies null quantities saved and invested at T =
1.  The functions of aggregate saving ( )×0S and aggregate investment ( )×0I
are defined:
5 ( ) [ ] [ ] 0000000 )()( bbaa PDBPDAS ×-+×-º×
 (7)
( ) [ ] [ ] 0110110 )()()()( I bbbaaabbaa PDbDbPDaDa ×+×+×+×º× .
( )×0S ,  ( )×0I  can serve for the interpretation of an equilibrium, but they seem
to play no distinct causal role for the determination of the equilibrium itself,
in comparison with the demand and supply functions of the individual
physical commodities.1
3. Orthodox tâtonnement applied to a reduced form
Let us substitute the quantities 11, BA  in (2), (3) with equations (4) and the
prices 11 , ba PP in the demand function , )(×jTD , 1,0   ;, == Tbaj , with the
price equations (1).  Let ),,( 100 WPP ba=p  denote the price vector and
)(pjTd  the demand function after substitution of 11 , ba PP  in )(×jTD .  The
corresponding excess demand functions are:
01100 )()()()( AdadadE bbaaaa -++º pppp
01100 )()()()( BdbdbdE bbaabb -++º pppp
LdldlE bbaaL -+º )()()( 11 ppp .
                                                
1 This negative remark has been put forward by Schefold (2004).
6The E functions are homogenous of degree zero in p   and satisfy the
following identity, derived from  Walras law (5) and from the assumption
that the markets for consumption goods at time T = 1 are in equilibrium
(equation (4)):
          0)()()( 10000 º++ ppp Lbbaa EWEPEP      (8).
Let us remain within the limits of adjustment processes with
tâtonnement and let t denote the logical time attached to the iterations
performed by the Walrasian auctioneer. The typical difficulty of
tâtonnement for a production economy, under constant returns to scale, is
“solved” here by transforming model (1), (6) into a reduced form to which
tâtonnement pricing is applied. This amounts to the method of calling prices
suggested by Schefold (2003).2  In our case, such tâtonnement analysis
becomes a quasi-equilbrium analysis also because the markets for
consumption goods at time T = 1 are assumed to be always in equilibrium.
Let us suppose that ( ))(0 paa EH , ( ))(0 pbb EH , ( ))(pLL EH  are sign-
preserving functions of the excess demands, with  ( )0aH = ( )0bH = ( )0LH  =
0. The following differential equations3 describe an orthodox dynamics with
                                                
2 At each iteration the auctioneer is supposed to call only the prices of the initial
endowments and to receive back from the producers the information of  the prices of goods
a, b at T = 1, which satisfy (1) and,  in a more general model with alternative methods of
production,  are associated with the choice of the cost minimizing techniques; next the
auctioneer receives the information of the individual net demands and calculates the
corresponding aggregate excess demands in order to call new prices of the initial
endowments.
3 As we are not concerned with proofs of stability, we have not specified other  properties
of the functions E and H (in particular the usual assumption that the functions are continuos
and differentiable) and the assumption that assures that, if ( ) 00 >p , then ( ) 0>tp for all
+¥<t .
7tâtonnement:
  ( ))(00 paaa EHdt
dP
=
   ( ))(00 pbbb EH
dt
dP
=                                      (9)
  ( ))(1 pLL EH
dt
dW
=
where the prices satisfy the equations 10011 =++= bbabbb PbPaWlP and the
functions ( ) ( ) ( )××× Lba HHH ,,  satisfy the identity
( ) ( ) ( ) 0º×+×+× Lbbbab HlHbHa . Then, given the initial call of  prices, ( )0p ,
a path of  subsequent calls ( )tp ,  0>t , can be determined by any two
differential equations chosen from (9) and by the numeraire equation.
Therefore, the determination not only of an equilibrium solution, but
also of the stability properties of such tâtonnement rule leaves no  “causal”
role to the functions ( )×0S , ( )×0I ,  of aggregate saving and investment. We
may concede that, granted the validity of Walras law (5), we could replace
one equation chosen from (1)-(4) with the equation ( )×0S = ( )×0I  to calculate
an equilibrium solution. This substitution  does not leads us very far,
because it does not assign to ( )×0S ,  ( )×0I any special role in the adjustment
mechanism.
8However the auctioneer, instead of crying prices according to
equations (9), is compelled to follow a different rule, if the theory is
consistent with the extension of Jevons’s Law to the capital goods.
4. The existence of a uniform effective rate of return
Assume that in equilibrium 0   ,0 00 >> ba PP , 0   ,0 11 >> ba PP , 01 >W  and
define the own rates of interests 1
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relative prices with good b chosen as a dated numeraire.
The price equations at current prices:
( )( )bbaaaaa rpbpawlp +++= 1ˆˆˆˆ 0011
                                                                          (10)
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9where 
br
w
w
+
º
1
ˆ1
0  is the discounted wage rate. Each equationn (10’) sets
that the effective factor of return, received from investing in the production
of a certain good, is equal to br+1 , the own factor of interest on the
numeraire. The “effectiveness” of such return results from the multiplication
of the terms in brackets: 1) the factor of appreciation of a bundle of a good
and of  a ‘bad’ (i.e. a  labour coefficient), 2) the own factor of profit
calculated at contemporary prices.
The law of unique price imposes the relation:
( ) )1(
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between the effective factors of return received from saving and lending the
goods a , b . The effective rate of return on each good is calculated by
multiplying  its own factor of interest for the factor of appreciation of the
good itself.  It should be noted that (11) pertains to the sphere of exchange
and must be interpreted as an equation, although its mathematical form
resembles a tautology. The usual notation of the relative prices, written as
ratios between nominal prices, can be indeed misleading. In fact (11) can be
written
11
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which apparently seems to be an identity. This is not the correct
interpretation of (11).  The relative price associated with a direct exchange
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of two commodities is not equal by definition  to the corresponding relative
price which is implicit   in a chain of (e.g. triangular) exchanges involving
other commodities. In particular, ÷÷
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 are equations. They must be interpreted as an
application of Jevons’s law (the law of unique price), which we assume to
hold both in equilibrium and in disequilibrium. They are the outcome of
spot-forward arbitrages on goods a, b, and they might be violated if the
markets should not be perfect.
Since good b is the numeraire , equation (11) becomes
         
 ( ) ba
a
a rr
p
p
+=+ 11
ˆ
ˆ
0
1 . (11”)
It follows from (10’), (11”) that br  represents the uniform effective rate of
return, which in the model applies to saving, lending and productive
investment. The recognition of a uniform rate of return for an economy,
which is not in a long period equilibrium, is a crucial step of the argument.
Garegnani assert 1) that capital goods are perfect substitutes for the
saver and 2) that the properties of the relative prices of commodities
available at different times (intertemporal relative prices) are different from
11
those pertaining to the relative prices of commodities available at the same
time (contemporary or current relative prices).  In the theory of
intertemporal equilibrium 1) and 2) must be grounded on an explicit  model
of individual choice. We shall isolate such a model through some
intermediate steps, which aim to avoid certain possible misunderstanding.
4. Capital goods are perfect substitutes for the saver
Following Schefold’s (2004) reconstruction of the microfoundations of
Hahn’s (Garegnani) model, let us  assume that the demand functions of
model (1)-(6) are derived from the rational choices of a representative
consumer, who is supposed to solve the problem
max )(×u
                       s.t.                    (12) 
1111000010000 bbaabbaaba PcPcPcPcWPbPa +++=++ l ,
that is the intertemporal budget constraint, where 00 ,ba  are the initial
endowments of goods a, b ; l the labour endowment; jTc  the dated
consumption of  good  j, baj ,=  , T = 0,1;   and )(×u  is the utility function,
all notations referred to the consumer.
In microeconomics the attribute “perfect substitutes” has a definite
meaning in the following cases:
i) if we specify )(×u = ),,,( 1100 baba ccccu and we assume that the
marginal rate of substitution between two consumption goods is
constant (perfect substitutes);
12
ii) if we define the indirect utility function
( ) ( )110011100 ,,,max,,,,, babababa ccccuyWPPPPf º
            s.t. 11110000 bbaabbaa PcPcPcPcy +++= ,where
            10000 WPbPay ba l++º  and we say that the physical  constituents of
            y are  perfect substitutes;
iii) if we assume that the consumer postpones at time T = 1 the choice of
consumption goods at T =1 and we specify )(×u = ),,( 00 sccu ba
where 000000 )()( bbaa PcbPcas -+-=  is his total saving at
discounted prices. In this case we can say that the physical
constituents of s   are perfect substitutes.
The attribute  “perfect substitutes” in the intertemporal context at issue does
not fit in any of cases i), ii), iii) above. In particular, the model (1)-(6) rules
out case iii), because the choice of the whole intertemporal plan of
consumption and saving is supposed to be made only at time T = 0 and
therefore the rational consumer does not attach any utility to the degrees of
freedom (flexibility, liquidity) of choice at time T = 1. Still cases ii) and iii)
suggest that another reason exists for the saver to treat the capital goods as
perfect substitutes, despite the fact that they do not enter into the (direct or
indirect) utility function of the consumer. In fact, we may distinguish
different facets, roles, functions of the same representative decision maker:
he is a consumer, a saver, an investor and a worker at the same time.  Each
facet can be supposed to maximize some objective function and the ensuing
(non schizophrenic) result is an optimal plan of consumption
*
1
*
1
*
0
*
0 ,,, aaba cccc , as a solution to problem (12). Besides the signals of the net
13
demands for goods and of the supply of labour services which are sent by
the consumer,
 ll =-- **1
*
10
*
00
*
0   ,  ,   ,   , aaba ccbcac ,
the saver sends the signal of his optimal saving plan at time T = 0 (with no
saving at T = 1):
   0
*
000
*
00
* )()( bbaa PcbPcas -+-= .
It remains to explain why *s  can be an independent effective signal. Why,
six signals, instead of five, are received by the auctioneer as distinct
effective market signals?
We can imagine that the saver receives from the consumer (the same
individual) the quantities non consumed )(   ),( 0000 ba cbca -- and the
purpose of the former is to transform their value
000000 )()( bbaa PcbPcas -+-=  into the maximum purchasing power
available at time T = 1. As in case ii), the physical constituents of s are
perfect substitutes for him, at the given contemporary prices 00 , ba PP . He
would change the physical composition )( 00 aca - ,  )( 00 bcb -  of s  before
lending the goods,  if all contemporary arbitrages should not be fully
exploited; otherwise he is indifferent to the basket of goods contained in s .
For the same reason the physical constituents of the income that he received
from the borrowers at the end of the period  are perfect substitutes for the
saver. He would exploit all possible spot-forward arbitrages in case equation
(11”) should not be initially satisfied, otherwise he is indifferent to the
physical composition of the income that he receives from the borrowers at T
= 1. We should note that for the saver “perfect substitutability” implies
14
indifference in the choice of the physical mix of  saving only if the prices
given to him satisfy Jevons’s law expressed by equation (11”),  which
concerns the effective own rates of return. Of course, saying that the goods
a, b are perfect substitutes for the saver does not mean that they are such
also for the consumer. Each dated good a, b is physically homogeneous; yet,
from the point of view of the two facets of the individual, 1100 ,,, baba cccc
are consumption goods, whereas )(   ),( 0000 ba cbca --   are capital goods.
5. Different properties of two types of relative prices and heterodox
tâtonnement
The previous argument implies that the auctioneer is prevented from
controlling  each own rate of return independently from the others. At each
iteration he cannot cry  prices which violate equations (10’) and  (11”). A
change in br  drags up or down  all equalized own effective rates  of return
and cannot be directly affected by the physical excess demand for capital
good b. Only the sign of the total value of the excess demands for all capital
goods at time T = 0 can induce the auctioneer to change the uniform
effective rate of return in a definite direction.   This brings about a quite
different tâtonnement, compared to the orthodox model (9).
Now the auctioneer is assumed to follow different rules for  changing prices,
according to the distinction between current   (contemporary) relative prices
and intertemporal relative prices. It is convenient to reformulate the excess
demand as functions of current prices and of the uniform effective rate of
return.
15
The individual budget constraint at current prices with 1ˆ 0 =bp ,
1ˆ 1 =bp  is:
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The aggregate demand function for commodity j at time T:
( )baajT rwppD ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ
~
110 . We can replace two prices in ( )×jTD
~
 with a solution to
the price equations (10), provided that br  falls within its feasible range. In
particular, after substitution of 11 ˆ  and ˆ wpa , we obtain the demand function
( )bajT rpd ,ˆ
~
0 .  Let us define the price vector ( )ba rp ,ˆˆ 0=p  and the excess
demand functions:
01100 )ˆ(
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)ˆ(
~
)ˆ(
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AdadadE bbaaaa -++º pppp
01100 )ˆ(
~
)ˆ(
~
)ˆ(
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LdldlE bbaaL -+º )ˆ(
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11 ppp
The E
~
 functions satisfy Walras law 0)ˆ(
~
)ˆ(
~
)ˆ(
~
10000 º++ ppp Lbbaa EWEPEP ,
but they are not homogenous of degree zero in ( )ba rp ,ˆˆ 0=p .
In the alternative reduced form of model (1),(6), we have one
contemporary relative price, 0ˆ ap ,  and one intertemporal relative price, the
rate br .  The auctioneer will call a higher (lower) 0ˆ ap  if and only if he finds
a positive (negative) excess physical demand )ˆ(
~
0 paE . Instead he will call a
16
higher (lower) rate  br  if and only if he finds that the value of the aggregate
demand for investment exceeds (falls short of) the value of the aggregate
supply of saving. 4. Such aggregate excess demand at current values is
)ˆ(
~
ˆ)ˆ(
~
ˆ 00 pp bboaao EpEp + .     Let ba HH
~
,
~
be smooth sign-preserving functions
of excess demands, with  ( )0~aH = ( )0
~
bH  = 0. Then the following differential
equations determine the tâtonnement dynamics for the whole economy:
             ( ))ˆ(~~ˆ 00 paaa EHdt
pd
=
( ))ˆ(~)ˆ(~ˆ~ 000 pp baabb EEpHdt
dr
+=                                     (14)
Given the initial prices, ( )tpˆ , 0=t , a path ( )tpˆ , 0>t  is  determined by the
differential equations (14). The paths of the remaining current and
intertemporal prices follow from the relations between current prices and
discounted prices and from the price equations (1) , (10)with  the numeraire
equations   1ˆ 1 =bp , and 11 =bP . The corresponding path of  the excess
demand for labour )ˆ(
~
pLE follows from Walras law
                                                
4  Assuming that  the price of a certain commodity reacts not only to the excess demand for
that commodity but also to the excess demand for other commodities is not a novel
approach in stability analysis.  In particular, the application of Newton’s method of
numerical analysis would prescribe that the price of each commodity reacts to the excess
demand for all commodities by a certain uniform coefficient and brings about a
proportional decrease in all excess demands (see Smale (1976)). However, the specific
feature of the adjustment described by (14) is the fact that an intertemporal price reacts to
the value of the excess demands for capital flows.
17
                          0)ˆ(~)ˆ(~)ˆ(~ 10000 º++ ppp Lbbaa EWEPEP .
The heterodox system of differential equations (14) can be compared with
the orthodox system  (9). The excess aggregate investment over aggregate
saving plays a causal role in the adjustment process (14). As a consequence,
the standard stability analysis is subverted.  In particular, even the strong
assumption that all physical goods are gross substitutes, with respect to the
functions of the excess demands )(),(),( 00 ppp Lba EEE , does not imply that
the same property applies to the physical excess demands
)ˆ(
~
0 paE , )ˆ(
~
0 pbE , )ˆ(
~
pLE  and to the aggregate excess demand for the capital
flow )ˆ(
~
)ˆ(
~ˆ 000 pp baa EEp + , which are the relevant functions in the
tâtonnement equations (14).
Therefore the problem of the shape of the demand and supply
schedules of aggregate capital re-emerges, although the model is formulated
by taking the physical endowments, instead of their total value, as given.
This is the main point stressed by Garegnani. The present case is different
from the problem of capital in the controversies of the Sixties only because
the dimensions of the magnitudes at issue are different: the flow dimension
of investment and saving versus the stock dimension of the demand and
supply of capital. ‘Badly behaved’ aggregate saving and investment
functions can be met in a model with many heterogenous capital goods and
can become a specific source of unstable equilibria for the same reasons. In
particular, the assumption that all goods are gross substitutes or the
assumption of diagonal dominance (jointly with a minor property imposed
18
on the excess supply of the numeraire)5, with respect to the excess demands
functions )(),(),( 00 ppp Lba EEE , are still sufficient conditions for the
uniqueness of equilibrium, but the theorems of global stability which rest
upon them do not prove that equilibrium is stable with respect to the
heterodox tâtonnement rule (14) which is consistent with Jevons’ Law.
6. Final comment and conclusion
Let us summarize the main results of the previous analysis and certain
unsettled questions.
1) The role of aggregate capital flows emerges from the heterodox analysis
of stability which has been formulated by equations (14), despite it is
absent in the determination of an equilibrium solution to equations (1),
(6) and in the traditional tâtonnement (9).
2) That role does not presuppose a monetary economy under uncertainty6
and that type of aggregation does not put an additional threat to
methodological individualism, in comparison to that which already
derives from the rudimentary price dynamics based on the assumption of
the auctioneer which calls unique prices.
                                                
5  See Arrow-Hahn (1971, Ch.9)
6 In this respect we depart from the interpretation of Garegnani’s approach given by
Schefold (2004), although the latter correctly points out that a similarity exists between the
approach adopted by the former and Clower’s (1969) formulation of the microeconomic
foundations of Keynes’s aggregate demand function.
19
3) In the simple model of intertemporal equilibrium (1)-(6), production is
subjected to constant returns to scale and the auctioneer is supposed to
be constrained in calling prices according to a rule similar to that
adopted by Schefold (2003). The intertemporal equilibrium model and
the corresponding tâtonnement could be extended assuming that
alternative techniques are available.
4)  We argued that the heterodox tâtonnement (14) brings about a
subversion in stability analysis. The general conclusion is that an
intertemporal equilibrium becomes exposed to a specific source of
instability (Garegnani 2003). We should refrain from concluding that,
since the new tâtonnement process may be unstable even under strong
restrictions put on the excess demand functions for individual goods (the
assumption of gross substitutes), a-fortiori more complicated adjustment
processes (e.g. processes with trading at false prices) may be unstable as
well. Further investigations should be necessary in this field of analysis,
because some counterintuitive results may turn out, as already Franklin
Fisher (1983) has reminded us with regard to the passage from the
traditional tâtonnement to more realistic stability processes, where the
convergence depends not only on the properties of the excess demand
functions, E, but also on those of the reactions functions, H. However,
also non-tâtonnement disequilibrioum models should be monitored in
order to ascertain whether they are  exposed to the fundamental source
of instability which has been re-appraised in this paper.
20
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